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!• The general idea of the thesis.
On July 14, 1958, a revolution swept from power the monarchy of
King Faisal II of Iraq and declared a republican form of government.
What were the reasons for social unrest in Iraqi society? How did col
lective excitement happen? What was the role of leadership prior to July
1958? What were the characteristics, objectives, and expressions of the
acting crowds of 1958? What were the characteristics of Iraqi public
opinion? How did esprit de corps develop in Iraq? What were the assets
and liabilities of the Kassim regime? What were the reasons behind the
"Rennaissance" Baath counter revolution on February 9, 1963? Why is
another revolution expected in Iraq? This paper will attempt to answer
these and many more questions about the Iraqi Revolution.
II. Review of the literature.
This paper is a sociological interpretation of the Iraqi Revolu
tion in terms of Herbert Bluster's thesis on social movement.
In his section, "Collective Behavior," in Robert E. Park's book,
An Outline of the Principles of Sociology, and as early as 1939, when the
Arabic countries were relatively quiet, Blumer predicted revolutions in
these countries. In his discussion of the extent and intensity of so-
Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in, An Outline of the
Principles £| Sociology, ed. Robert E. Park (New York, 1939), pp. 221-82.
cial unrest, he said: "It may extend to a larger dispersed population as
in the instance of contemporary Moslem unrest."2 Blumer suggested stages
of social movements: "It is possible to delineate stages roughly in the
career of a social movement which represents this increasing organiza
tion.1^
For analysis of the stages of the Iraqi revolution, I shall attempt
to rely on the following sources:
A. Herbert Blumer's discussion of Dawson and Gettys1 four stages
of social movements: (1) the stage of social unrest, (2) the stage of
popular excitement, (3) the stage of formalization, and, (4) the stage
of institutionalization.^ He devoted a separate chapter to each stage.
B. Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys1 discussion and analysis
of the stages of social movements in their book, Am Introduction to Sociol
ogy. 5 They said that:
Organized social movements follow a fairly uniform pattern
in their natural history though they vary from that pattern
in certain details. Practically all of them tend to pass
through four definite stages in their development — the
preliminary stage of social unrest, the popular stage of
collective excitement, the stage of formal organization,
and finally the institutionalization.6
C. Pitirim A. Sorokin's analysis of revolution in his book, The




5Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociol
ogy., (New York, 1929), p. 709.
6Ibid.
...every revolutionary period as a whole inevitably
consists of two stages indissolubly connected with
one another. "Reaction" is not a phenonmenon beyond
the limits of revolution, but is an unavoidable part
of the revolutionary process itself, its second half.
The dictatorship of Robespierre or Lenin... was only
the mark of its transition into the second stage —
the stage of "reaction" or "restraint" but not its
end. Only when "reaction" is finished, when society
enters the period of its normal evolution -- only then
revolution may be considered as finished.7
Pitirim Sorokin drew the following scheme, to illustrate these
stages:
Revolutionary Period
Normal Period Normal Period
tage 2nd. Stage
(Reaction) 8
D. Lyford P. Edwards said in his book, The Natural History of
Revolution, that: "...it takes three generations to develop a revo
lution.""
A more complete synthetic scheme based on the work of Gettys,
Blumer, Dawson, Sorokin, and Edwards, will be employed as a frame of
^Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociology £f Revolution. (Philadelphia,
1925, pp. 7-8.
8Ibid., p. 8.
^Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution, (Chicago,
1927), p. 17.
reference to analyze the steps of the Iraqi Revolution. This combina
tion is stated briefly in the third section of this paper. The four-
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stage model is quoted verbatim from an article by Rex D. Hopper, who
depended mainly on Blumer's thesis on social movements.
III. A brief exposition of the leading ideas.
After a study of the works of such pioneers as Sorokin, Edwards,
Gettys, Dawson and Blumer, Rex D. Hopper has constructed a general typol
ogy of revolutionary behavior which was applied to Iraq, drawn in four
stages. The contributions of each of these men are stated in the second
section of the chapter.
A. The preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement and unrest.
In this stage, the socio-psychological conditions may be grouped
under six headings arranged on a sequential order:
1. General restlessness which manifests itself in:
a. Wish repression.
b. Restless behavior of individuals.
c. Increase in crime, vice, insanity, suicide, agitation and
travel.
2. The development of class antagonisms as shown by:
a. The increase in wealth, intelligence, and power of "re
pressed groups".
Rex D. Hopper, "Revolutionary Process", Social Forces, XXVIII
(March: 1951), pp. 270-9. Also Rex D. Hopper, "The Sociology of Revolu
tionary Change," in Introduction to Sociology, edited by James H. S.
Bossard, Walter A. Lunden, Lloyd V. Ballard, and Lawrence Foster,
(Harrisburg, 1959), Ch. XXV, pp. 509-528.
^Blumer, oj>. cit.. p. 224.
b. The development of a condition wherein men of ability
are shut out from careers of any consequence.
3. Marked governmental inefficiency.
4. Reform efforts on the part of the government.
5. Cultural drift in the direction of revolutionary change.
6. Spread of socialization of restlessness as evidenced by:
a. Increased tension, cramp, and irritation.
b. Increased talk of revolution.
c. Wandering of attention from one individual, object, or
line of action to another.
B. The popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest.
The socio-psychological conditions in this state could be classi
fied as:
1. The spread of discontent and contagious extension of the
several signs of unrest and discontent as manifested in:
a. Increased activity.
b. Growing focus of attention.
c. Heightened state of expectancy*
2. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals including:
a. Wish reformulation.
b. Loss of faith in their leadership on the part of the re
pressed classes and the loss of faith in themselves on
the part of the leaders.
c. Spread of rumor and scandal and the development of a
literature of exposure.
d. Emergence of the "good man" fallacy.
e. Identification of the guilty group, focusing of attention
6.
on it, and the development of an "advertising offensive"
against it.
f. Development of an "oppression psychosis."
3. The fabrication of a social myth with these allied character
istics:
a. Creation of collective illusions, myths, and doctrines.
b. Emergence of the economic incentive to revolutionary
action.
c. Development of a tentative object of loyalty.
4. The emergence of conflict with the "out-group" and the re
sultant increase in "in-group" consciousness.
5. The organization of the discontented for the purpose of remedy
ing the threatened or actual breakdown of government.
6. The presentation of revolutionary demands, which if granted,
would amount to the abdication of those in power.
C. The formal state of the formulation of issues and formation of publics.
Two major developments occur:
1. The fixation of motives (attitudes) and the definite formula
tion of aims (values). This major characteristic is paralleled
by these developments:
a. A struggle between the conservative, moderate and radical
factions of the revolutionary group: the continuation of
the "in-group -- out-group" conflict, and the intensifi
cation of class antagonisms.
b. The moderate faction gains control to the accompaniment of
these typical events:
(1) Release of prisoners.
(2) Apparent cooperation of reformers and revolutionists.
(3) Abortive attempts of the radicals to seize power.
(4) Radical-conservative coalition attacks on the reformers.
(5) Evidence of manifest incompetence on the part of the
reformers.
c. The reformers are confronted with these typical handicaps:
(1) Fear of armed invasion.
(2) Fear of internal rebellion.
(3) Political inexperience.
d. the desertion of lukewarm supporters.
e. The elimination of the conservative by the reformers.
f. A movement toward the "left" or an "uncontrollable" swing
of the masses toward radicalism.
g. The emergence of the typical "perversions."
h. The development of a set of norms formally stated in dogma
and formally expressed in rituals, together with a marked
increase in the use of shibboleths.
i. The fusion of patriotism and the social myth elevate the
radicals to power.
j. The radicals are also confronted with three typical dangers:




2. The development of an organizational structure with leaders.
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This is accompanied by:
a. The increasing recognition of organizational breakdown
and governmental inefficiency.
b. The development of a condition of dual sovereignty.
c. The occurrence of an immediate precipitating factor
and the seizure of power by the radicals.
d. The presence of conflict within the ranks of the
radicals.
e. The formation of a provisional government.
f. A "lull" between the seizure of power by the radicals
and the initiation of the "Reign of Terror."
g. The use of the"Reign of Terror" as a control technique.
D. The Institutional State of Legalization and Social Organization.
The revolution transfer from the formal to the institutional




a. Psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional
foundations of the revolution.
b. Moral let-down and return to old habits (attitudes),
including "escape recreation" and the re-emergence
of graft, speculation, and corruption become deter
rents to continued revolutionary behavior.
c. Great economic distress, amounting almost to chaos,
demands a settling down.
2. Resultant characteristics:
a. End of the "Reign of Terror;" granting of amnesty;
return of exiles; repression of extremists; and
search for scapegoats.
b. Increase in powers of central government, frequently
resulting in dictatorship.
c. Social reconstruction along lines of the old social
structure, but with the new principles (values)
essentially intact.
d. Dilution of the revolutionary ideal: transformation
of evangelistic fervor for social change into the
desire for conquest; transformation of the "revolu
tionary sect" into a "political denomination."
e. Re-accommodation of church and state.
f. "Reaction to the reaction" represented by escape
recreation.
g. The revolution becomes attitudinally established and
develops a pernament organization that is acceptable
to the current mores; that is, it is institutionalized.
I shall attempt to use all these headings and sub-headings,
where pertinent and relevant, to analyze the Iraqi Revolution.
In the next chapter I shall discuss the historical background
of Iraq, as well as its geography, population, ethnic groups, and
languages. This discussion is for the purpose of acquainting the
reader with some pertinent information about Iraq and its people.
An understanding of the dynamics of the revolution of July 14,
1958, requires some background knowledge about Iraqi society structure.
10
Chapter three is a discussion of the preliminary stage of the
revolution: The Preliminary Stage of Mass (individual) Excitement
and Unrest.
Chapter four is a discussion of the second stage: The Popular
Stage of Crowd (collective) Excitement and Unrest, while Chapter five
discusses the third stage: The Formal Stage of the Formation of Issues
and Formulation of Publics.
The fourth and final stage of the revolution, The Institutional





The relationship between Iraq's land and the living conditions
of its inhabitants is very strong. The economic structure of Iraq
has been based on agriculture throughout its history. In the
Directory of the Republic of Iraq. M. F. Darwish pointed out that
between 1951 and 1960, one of the earliest villages of the prehis
toric age was discovered by Professor Ralph Solecki in Shanldar
Cave. From this discovery Mr. Darwish concluded that agricultural
life in Iraq existed 80,000 to 50,000 years ago.1^ Dr. Hashim Jawad,
one of the outstanding Iraqi sociologists, attempted in 1936 to
analyze Iraqi society. He mentioned in his book, Introduction to
Iraqi Society Structure, that it is quite clear to the student of
Iraqi history that the relationship between its land and the economic,
social, and political conditions of its inhabitants is closely related.
For this reason, it is necessary to take a quick look at the geography
of Iraq.
I^m. F. Darwish, et. al., Directory of the Republic o_f Iraq,
(Baghdad, 1960), p. 108.
Jawad, Introduction to Iraqi Society Structure.
(Baghdad, 1936), p. 4.
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Iraq is located between 48° 45' and 38° 45* north longitude,
and between 29° 15* and 38° 25* east latitude. The total area of the
country is 446,713 square kilometers,1^ or about as large as the State
of California* Iraq is bordered by Turkey from the north, Iran from
the east, the Arabic Gulf and Arabia from the south, and Syria and
Jordan from the west.15
The weather in Iraq is similar to the weather in the desert.
In fact, if Iraq had no rivers, it would be nothing but desert.
The weather is characterized by great differences in temperature
between day and night and between summer and winter. A few rain
showers fall during the winter only. The mountainous region of
the country is cool in general, but the rest of the country is hot
and dry. The temperature in the summer ranges between 100° and
130° Fahrenheit. In the winter the temperature is often as low as
25° Fahrenheit.16
The northern part of Iraq depends mainly on the winter rains
and a few creeks for irrigation. The southern portion of the
country depends upon dams across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers,
the tributaries of these two rivers, and water canals for irrigation.
Table I shows the percentage of water used for irrigation that comes
from canals, rainfall, and pumping stations along the rivers.
UOne Kilometer - .62 mile or 3,281 feet.
l^Darwish, oj». cit., pp. 53-57.






43.1% irrigated by rainfall
Area: 25,000 Kb2
Table I also gives the area in square kilometers that is irrigated
by the three methods mentioned*
The terrain of Iraq is divided into three parts; the delta,
the hills, and the mountains. Table II gives the percentage and
area of land in the various categories.
, o£. cit.. p. 75.
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TABLE II
IRAQ'S TOPOGRAPHY IN PERCENTAGE AND AREA18
SECTION
1. Mountainous area in north
and northwest
2. The hills
3. The plateau in the south











The plateau in the south consists of an alluvial deposit at the mouth
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This area is about 300 miles long
and 100 miles wide. This strip of land is level and is situated about
150 feet above sea level. The soil is very fertile.
The hills begin just north of the delta and extend up to the
Toros mountains. The hills are about 1,000 feet above sea level. The
major portion of the hill country is called the "Gazirah" or "Island."
The land is dry and poorly developed except in the upper portion of
the area where the land is fertile. In the lower part of the hills
where the land is poorly developed one can find natural grass
scattered about where sheep and cattle can find grazing. Agriculture
in the hill country depends upon the winter rains. The main farming
products are barley and wheat. There is very little irrigation in
that section, and sometimes there is not enough rain to grow the grain.
The mountains are located in the northeastern part of the
l8Ibid.. p. 64.
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country which is called Kurdistan. It contains several chains of
mountains some about 14,000 feet above sea level* The valleys
between these mountains are fertile areas, but they have not been
developed.''-"
TABLE III





Mountains, deserts, lakes and grass land for
cattle grazing:
307,713 Km2
As you can see from Table III, less than half of the land which could
be used for agriculture is in actual use.
The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers start from the mountains in
Kurdistan, flowing through the hills and the delta until they form
one river and pour in the Arabic Gulf.
Jawad, O£. cit.. pp. 4-6.
Darwish, oj>. cit.. p. 75.
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2. Population
The population of Iraq had never been accurately recorded
because the people look with suspicion on governmental action such
as taking the population census. They believe that the census is
for military draft purposes, or for the collection of taxes. The
first attempt to take the population census in Iraq was in 1947.
At that time the writer took part in the census. Most of the fami
lies did not give the correct information, and some of them refused
to cooperate at all. Those who did give some information gave more
or less than the actual number of people in their households accord
ing to their interpretation of the motives of the government. Dr.
Hashim Jawad had a similar view. He adds that some of the nomadic
tribes and poor farmers travel all the time, either for the purpose
of grazing or for seeking employment in another section of the
country. Most of the farmers and nomads have no permanent residence.
The 1957 population census is more dependable, because it was
constructed on a more scientific basis and administered according to
the best modern procedures. The official population census for the
year 1957, however, has not been published to this date. Tables IV
and V give a breakdown of the population of Iraq according to the
best available population figures* Table IV gives a numerical break
down of the male and female population. Table V gives a breakdown
of population according to residence. In Table V the number of
nomads is given as 68,562. This figure is probably an understate
ment since the constant shifting of the nomadic population makes it
extremely difficult to make an accurate tabulation. The number given
in the other two catagories is probably fairly accurate.
17
TABLE IV






BREAKDOWN OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO TYPE OF SETTLEMENT22
AREA PERCENTAGE NUMBER
Large Cities 38 2,480,102
Small Towns and Villages 61 3,989,445
Nomads 1 68,562
Total 100 6,538,109
3. Ethnic Groups and Languages
Man lived in Iraq as early as the Stone Age, and he was in
constant contact with other populations and nations throughout its
history until modern times. This gave two results:
A. The people of Iraq are a mixture of many races and they
have many origins.
B. As a result of the numerous foreign occupations of Iraq,




of their ancestors. Much of the culture of the groups who lived in
Iraq during foreign occupations was fused into the greater Kurdish
or Arabic culture and became part of it. However, some of the groups
have maintained their own unique culture throughout the centuries.23
Usually ethnic groups live in clusters of small villages which
are situated apart from the villages of other ethnic groups. In
these villages the people speak their indigenous language and practice
certain religious, ethical, and cultural patterns which are different
from those of the rest of the population. As long as these groups
isolate themselves in small villages, they tend to retain most of
their own culture. When members of the villages go to large cities
such as Baghdad and Basra, they gradually lose their unique customs
as well as their language. They start speaking and behaving like
Arabs. They usually maintain their religion. For example, Chris
tians in small villages still speak Syrian or Chaldean, but in large
cities like Mosul they know no language except Arabic. As is common
with many ethnic groups, these people then try to identify themselves
with the majority. When they move to large cities they claim that
they are Arabs.
The Iraqi population is divided into the following cultural
or ethnic religious groups:
(1) Arab Moslems — The Arab Moslems are the majority group
in Iraq. They are divided into two sub-groups; the Shiias and the
Sunnis. The former is slightly larger in number. From establishment
of the monarchy in 1921 until the present time, the successive Iraqi
23Ibid., p. 421.
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cabinets usually contained a Sunni majority. At times only one
Shia minister was appointed, and this was done only to keep up the
appearance of proportional representation.2^
(2) The Kurds — The largest minority are the Kurds, who
speak their own language and maintain their own culture. The Kurds
are also Moslem Sunnis, but they have no power in the government.
They have no political affiliation with the Moslem Sunnis who sit
in the cabinet. Occasionally they might have one member represented
in the cabinet, but he is powerless. The total number of Kurds is
estimated to be about 4.5 millions, but all of them do not live in
Iraq. There are Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and the Soviet
Union. The Kurds in Iraq comprise about one-third of the total popu
lation. They rebelled against the monarchy from the time it was
established in 1921 until it collapsed in 1958.25 They rebelled be
cause the monarchy tried to make them reject their language and their
culture. For example, a child had to learn Arabic in order to go to
school.
(3) Christians — The Christians are the third largest group
in Iraq. They are divided into three groups:
a. The Syrian Orthodox who live mainly in the northern
part of Iraq, whose culture existed for several centuries throughout
the Middle East. All that remains of their culture is concentrated
2*George Lenczowski, The Middle East jtn World Affairs. (New
York, 1962), p. 267-268.
25Ibid., p. 265.
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in a few email towns, where they speak the Syrian language. They
are a Syrian-speaking population numbering about 12,000. They are
religiously affiliated with the Eastern Orthodox Church.
b. The second group is the Syrian Catholic. They are
similar in culture to the Syrian Orthodox except in the matter of
religion. Their language and customs are the same, but they are a
part of the Roman Catholic Church. They number about 25,000 people.
c. The Chaldeans make up the third group of Christians.
Their number is about 86,500 people, and they are all that remain of
a once dominant culture which existed in northern Iraq.26
(4) Assyrians -- In contrast to other ethnic groups, the
Assyrians were newcomers who came from Turkey and Iran during World
War I. They settled temporarily in a few villages in Northern Iraq,
and were protected by the British Mandatory Authorities, who recruit-
ed among them for guard duty on the Royal Air Force air fields and
installations. The Assyrians are Nestorian Christians, which is a
branch of the Anglican Church.27
To make it easy to control Iraq, the British government used
the Assyrians as a cheap weapon to weaken Iraqi nationalist spirit.
In 1933, the Assyrians asked for autonomy from the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi government responded by sending a punitive expedition,
which burned some twenty Assyrian villages, massacring their in
habitants.28
26Darwish, op., cit., pp. 419-429.
27Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 266.
28Ibid., p. 267.
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(5) The Yazidy, or the Devil Worshippers -- According to
the 1957 Census, there are 19,000 Yazidys in Iraq. Most of them
live in Sinjar. Their religious cults are a mixture of Christianity,
Islam, and Zoroastrian. They speak Arabic and worship two powers,
good and evil. The good power is symbolized by God who will not
attempt to do anything but good, and the evil power is symbolized by
the devil. Those who want happiness should worship the devil and
ask his approval on their behavior. They reason that God is good
and will not harm his children. The devil as the power of evil will
bring evil to them unless they worship him.29
(6) The Sibbah -- According to the 1947 Census there are
6,597 Sibbahs in Iraq. They believe that their religious beliefs
derive from the teaching of St. John the Baptist. Anthropologists
have proven that they still believe and practice much of the Assyrian
and Babylonian religion and cult. They worship the stars and believe














Arabic is the official language of the government, and it is
taught in every school in the country. The majority of the people
speak Arabic. This is not the classical Arabic of the Koran, but
a vernacular having various regional dialects. Every town and
village has developed its own dialect. Even though the people
speak different dialects, they can understand one another. Some
of the small ethnic groups still speak their own language.
4. History
Iraq has a long history of highly developed early civiliza
tions. These civilizations existed at very early periods because:
(1) the fertile soil of the land was conducive to agriculture, (2)
the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers allowed the early development
of a complex irrigated agriculture, (3) the people who lived in the
area were conscious of using agriculture as a way of life.
M. F. Darwish said the fossil remains of the earliest people
who used sickles for agriculture were discovered near a cave on Mount
Carmel. These people were called Natufians. Their name referred
to the valley in which they lived. The culture of the Natufians
existed during the last period of the old Stone Age, and they formed
the beginning of an agricultural society in the area now known as
Iraq. The same type of sickles were found near Hassonah's Hill which
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is near the site of modern Mosul.31 The discoveries of Professor
Ralph Solecki were mentioned earlier. He discovered fossil remains
of man who lived as early as 50,000 B.C. in Shanidar Cave on Baradost
Mountain. This mountain is near the city of Rawandooz.
In his book, Iraq, George L. Harris said that the early devel
opment of a complex irrigated agriculture led to an increase in the
food supply which caused population growth and the rise of the ear
liest cities. The city as a new form of social organization followed
the food-gathers, the hunters, and small villages of farmers who in
habited the area in the earlier Neolithic Age. Mr. Harris concluded
that:
This vocational specialization had originated, or
at least perfected, the basic ideas and techniques
that marked man's emergence from his pre-historic
past: the wheel, the plow, metallurgy, massive
architecture, writing, mathematics, complex govern
ment, and written codes of law.-*2
In studying the history of Iraq in its golden ages, we notice
that economic prosperity was accomplished by the people as a result
of employing the rivers to irrigate the largest possible area of
its fertile soil. This was accomplished as a result of two factors:
(1) the advancements of agricultural machines and their popular usage,
and (2) the sharing of farm products by owners and laborers.33
31Ibid., pp. 108-111.
32George L. Harris, Iraq, (New Haven, 1958), p. 7.
33Jawad, O£. cit.. p. 2.
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Here by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers were developed the
high civilizations of the Sumerians (2500 B.C.), the Babylonians
(2100 B.C.), the Assyrians (800-700 B.C.), the Chaldeans (616 B.C.),
and the Arab Empire (700-1100 A.D.), and many others.3*
The Arab Empire was not necessarily the greatest of the
civilizations, but it has been the most lasting. The Abbassid
Caliphs of the Arab Empire fell to the hands of the Mongol nomads
who came from Central Asia. Their leader, Hulagu, conquered Baghdad
in the year 1258, destroying all he touched. Most of the inhabitants
of Baghdad were massacred. They threw the books of the Baghdad
library in the Tigris River. One Arab writer who lived during that
time said that the Tigris was turned red and blue for several days.
The Arabic culture survived the destructive occupation of the
Mongols as well as many other occupations of the country until the
present time when it is the dominant culture of Iraq.
In the year 1638, Turkish forces led by Murad IV stormed
Baghdad, beginning an era of Turkish occupation which continued un
til World War 1.35 After about three-hundred years of Turkish occu
pation, the natives formed habits of obedience to the Turkish rulers.
Established ways of acting accompanied by satisfaction was going on.
In 1908 the Turks appointed an Arab Mullah3** called Hussein to
3*Irving L. Gordon, Reviewing World History, (New York, 1960),
pp. 12-20.
35Darwish, oj>. £it., p. 218.
36The Mullah in Islam is equal to the pastor in Christianity.
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be guardian of the Islamic Holy City of Mecca in Southern Arabia.
In 1916, the British encouraged Hussein to turn his people against
the Turks with the promise of making Hussein and his sons kings of
the Arab Countries. Hussein's sons, Faisal and Abdullah responded
enthusiastically and helped the British take over Damascus in 1918.
While the fighting was going on in Damascus, Syria, other British
forces under Sir Stanley Maude took the City of Baghdad from the
Turks in the year 1917.
5. Preliminary Statement
It is the aim of social scientists to be objective, to mini
mize personal bias, and to be ethically neutral when analyzing human
behavior. But I must admit that, because I was born and reared
during the Iraqi revolution, I have my love to Iraq, my admiration
and respect to certain political groups and leaders, my hate to
certain people and groups. I also have my hopes for the future of
Iraq and my fear for the safety of my family who reside in Iraq at
the present time. In spite of this, I shall try to emancipate my
self from all feelings and sentiments to the best of my ability.
The French, American and Russian revolutions have been analyz
ed numerous times by an army of writers. The Iraqi revolution is
still going on and is not over. To my knowledge, however, this is
the first attempt to analyze the Iraqi revolution within a sociological
frame of reference. In using a sociological frame of reference we
have to relate the facts collected on revolutionary behavior to
sociological concepts.
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Crane Brinton said in The Anatomy of Revolution, that:
Actually the scientist cannot work without a
conceptual scheme; and though the relation be
tween facts and conceptual schemes is not by
any means clear, it is at least clear that a
conceptual scheme involves something beside
facts, involves, indeed, a working mind.3?
The Iraqi revolution is not similar to all other revolutions.
It is unique in its historical setting, unique in its processes, and
unique in its character. But the use of a constructed typology of
revolutionary behavior has considerable heuristic value.
37Crane Brinton, The Anatomy £f Revolution, (New York, 1952),
p. 10.
CHAPTER III
THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF MASS (INDIVIDUAL)
EXCITEMENT AND UNREST
In this preliminary stage, the socio-psychological conditions
may be grouped under six headings, arranged on a sequential order.
I. General restlessness which manifests itself jLn three develop
ments.
A. The breakdown of the habit of obedience to governmental authority.
The Turkish occupation of Iraq that had existed for approxi
mately three hundred years had taken a set form* The population had
accepted the Turkish occupation and had settled down to obeying the
Turkish authorities. Then came the events of World War I. Between
January 9, 1917, and March 11, 1917, the British army under the
leadership of Sir Stanley Maude had conquered Iraq and driven the
Turkish army back to the north.-*8 This event had disturbed the
routine way of life and created an elementary form of collective be
havior.
According to Herbert Blunter, spontaneous and elementary col
lective behavior is aroused when "...conditions of unrest or distur
bance in the usual forms of living or routines of life occur."3*
The British conquest of the Turks in Iraq gave the people
an impulse or a desire to rid themselves of the British occupation and
38Darwish, op_. £it., p. 219.
39Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," Principles £f
Sociology, ed. Alfred McClung Lee (New York, 1962), p. 171.
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have a self-ruling government because: (1) The Arabs saw the Turks
and the British fighting over their country while they stood by and
watched; (2) the Turks were Moslems, and they shared the same re
ligion with the majority of the population; (3) the Turks also
shared many of the folkways and mores of the Arabs; (4) the British
army of occupation had nothing in common with the Arabs. Their re
ligion and folkways were completely different* As a result of all
these factors, a breakdown of the "habit of obedience" occurred.
The Iraqi people did not transfer their habit of obedience from
the Turkish to the British authorities. The British did not have
a monopoly of power in Iraq, because, as Peter Atnann put it: "The
power monopoly of the state^0 depends largely, not on the consent
of the governed, but on their habit of obedience whatever its motive.
Amann states further that a revolution can be defined as:
...a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's
monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening
of the habit of obedience. The sequence of this break
down varies. *
We conclude from the foregoing that the Iraqi revolution started in
March, 1917, because the habit of obedience of the Iraqi people to
the government was definitely broken at that time.
defines the state as, "...a political organization
exercising, or able to exercise, a monopoly of armed forces, justice
and administration over a given area and population."
Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science
Quarterly. LXX VII (March, 1962), p. 38.
in, O£. cit., p. 38.
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B. The development of a balked disposition mind - set.
The breakdown of the habit of obedience in Iraq was exhibited
in dissatisfaction with the British occupation. Herbert Blumer said:
"When people have impulses, desires, or dispositions which cannot be
satisfied by the existing forms of living, they are in a state of
unrest."«
The experience of seeing the power of the Turks fall to the
British caused a general feeling of unrest among the Iraqi people.
They had an urgent need to act, to assert their own power, but they
felt balked even before they tried to act.^4
C. Restless behavior of the individuals.
From March, 1917, until June 30, 1920, the Iraqi people re
mained restive under British control. During this three year period
the temper of the people was building up to violence. On June 30,
1920, an action occurred which allowed the people to discharge their
discomfort and frustrations. There was a skirmish between the British
troops and Iraqi people in the small town of Rumaitha, and the first
bullets were exchanged. This skirmish was followed by similar re
actions all over the country. There were losses on both sides, but
the British lost many men and much ammunition.^5 Their losses were
so heavy that after about six months Sir Percy Cox, the British gover
nor, asked Abdul Rohman el Nakeeb to establish a temporary government
as a step for self-government.
43Blumer, op_. cit., p. 171.
**Ibid.
4*Darwish, ££• £*£•» P* 220»
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II. The Development of Class Antagonisms.
A. The origin of the governing class.
The British government began to realize that they could not
stay in Iraq as conquerors. They were forced to allow the Iraqi
people to think they were self-governing. The British authorities
asked many of the natives to accept positions in the new government,
but they were careful to select natives who would cooperate with
them. Thus was born a new class of people in Iraq - the governing
class.
B. The increase in power and wealth of the governing class.
As soon as the governing class accepted their new positions,
their bank accounts soared higher and higher. They built huge
mansions and began to spend their vacations in Europe. Most of
their wealth had come to them illegally. The royal family was
relatively poor originally. They resided in Mecca and lived off
the proceeds from pilgrims during the season of religious pilgrimages.
After the British awarded them the crown, they became wealthy in a
very short time. The power of the governing class started to increase
gradually as the British placed more trust in them. As the Iraqi
governing class gained power, they tried to foster the antagonism
of the people against the British officials, but this was a very
slow process.
III. The origin and development of circular reaction.
The temporary government under Abdul Rohman el Nakeeh helped
the situation very little, and the tension that had been building up
continued. Because of the continuing tension, Sir Ninston Churchill
was forced to act. On March 9, 1921, he had a conference with his
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top military advisers in Cairo. The decision of the meeting was to
make Faisal, son of Hussein of Mecca, king of Iraq. Faisal had been
in London for some time asking the British government to fulfill its
promise to make him king of one of the Arabic countries. Faisal had
become more insistent in his demands after he was expelled from Syria.
On June 23, 1921, Faisal entered Baghdad where he was welcomed
by the British governor. In the short period of three weeks the
temporary government "decided" to make him king of Iraq. An election
was conducted by the British authorities, and they claimed that Faisal
won ninety-seven percent of the votes.^6
Certainly, Faisal I owed his crown to England, and in actual
fact the monarchy was a puppet regime in the hands of the British.
The Iraqi people realized this, and the breakdown of the habit of
obedience to the monarchy continued, as witnessed in the following
examples: (a) The Kurds who constituted one-third of the population
had abstained from voting as a token of their disapproval at being
ruled by an Arab Pro-British king*^ Under the leadership of Shiek
Mahmoud the Kurds revolted against the king in 1927 and 1931. (b)
The Shiias were rather cool to Faisal. They looked on him as an
"imported" Sunni ruler. The Shia hierarchy was anti-British beside
being anti-Sunni and ostensibly used passive resistance in Southern
Iraq to counter Anglo-Iraqi projects.***'
46ibjd., pp. 220-221.
op. cit., p. 265.
op. cit., p. 327.
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By 1922 Faisal was so annoyed by their activities that he ordered
forty of their religious leaders, or ulama. to be deported to Iran.
The Shiias, through their clergy, had strong links with Iran, a pre
dominately Shia country.49 (c) Except for a handful of politicians
who accepted the arrangements with England, the Sunnis hated the
pro-British king who was "imported" from Saudi Arabia, (d) All
minorities, including the Christians, felt that they were ruled by
a Moslem-foreigner. The natives who belonged to minority groups
had very little power in the government. Key governmental positions
and cabinet posts were usually occupied by Moslems. In general,
minorities had less access to jobs and business opportunities than
the Arab Moslems. The above mentioned conditions of Iraqi groupings
made individuals respond to one another and carry on conversations
about the government with members of other groups, "interpreting one
another's actions or remarks and then reacting on the basis of the
interpretation," as Herbert Blunter put it in his explanation of
"circular reaction." He further states that:
Responses, consequently, are not made directly to the
stimulation, but follow, rather, upon interpretation.
Further, they are likely to be different in nature
from the stimulating acts, being essentially adjusted
to these acts. "
This circular reaction was expressed by a strong national agitation
against British forces. It gave the people a common feeling about
the pro-British monarchy and was the basis for the acting crowds and
mobs which took place in Iraq at a later date.
, oj>. cit», p. 170.
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After a year of such agitation the British decided to exer
cise its control through a treaty with the puppet monarchy regime.
Lenczowski reports that such a treaty was concluded on October 10,
1922. Together with four important subsidiary agreements, the treaty
confirmed British control of Iraq by giving Britain the right to:
(1) appoint "advisers" to the Iraqi government, (2) "assist" the
Iraqi Army, (3) protect foreigners, (4) "advise" Iraq on fiscal mat
ters, and (5) "advise" Iraqi people on matters of foreign relations.51
The words "advisers," "assist," and "advise," were included in the
treaty because the British feared a revolt of the Iraqi people. Cer
tainly in practice these "advisers" and "assistants" were British
officers who handed down orders to the Iraqi officials. The treaty
would have been more honest if it had read, "Orders will be handed
down by the British officers." The treaty left no authority to the
Iraqi officials. They could not act on the simplest matter without
being "advised" first.
IV. The continuing revolution as exhibited by, ethnic group insurrec
tions.
In order to exercise more control over the country, the British
helped establish the Iraqi Army on one hand and aid some insurrection
ist movements against the government on the other. Although the es
sential duty of the army was to defend Iraq from outside aggression,
it was used in fighting any movement or revolt against the corrupt
puppet regime. The army was used to suppress a number of insurrec
tions:
51Lenczowski, pj>. cit., p. 270.
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A. The First Kurdish Movement of Sheik Mahmoud - 1927.
B. The Second Kurdish Movement of Sheik Mahmoud - 1931.
C. The First Barzani-Kurdish Movement - 1932.
D. The Assyrian Massacre of 1933.
E. The Chasing of Khakil Khoshboy's group of 1935.
F. The First Euphrates Movement of 1935.
6. The Sinjar Movement of 1935.
H. The Second Euphrates Movement of 1936.
I. The Gailani-Nazi Movement of 1941.
J. The Second Barzani Movement of 1943.
K. The Third Barzani Movement of 1945.52
For a period of eighteen years, 1927 - 1945, the Iraqi Army
was used against the above mentioned groups to put down an insur
rection or an unsuccessful revolt.
V. Marked governmental inefficiency.
A. Inefficient bureaucracy with corrupt officials.
In order to understand the problems during the monarchy,
1921 - 1958, we have to take a quick look at the local governmental
system. The present local governmental system was initiated in the
year 539 B.C., during the Persian conquest and was changed and de
veloped by the various peoples who occupied Iraq through the years.
At the present time Iraq is divided into fourteen districts called
Lewah. Each district is divided into smaller divisions called Kadah,
and each of the latter contains many Nahiyah. Each Nahiyah contains
52Darwish, oj>. cit., pp. 326-327.
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several villages. In the 14 Lewah there are 60 Kodah, 174 Nahiyah
and 9,919 villages and towns. In every Lewah. or district, there
are two councils elected by the people to manage its affairs and
carry out the orders handed down to them by the Minister of the In
terior. With the exception of the members of the two councils in
each district, all officials of the local government are appointed
by the Minister of the Interior. There is but one law that regulates
the duties of all local officials in the country. According to this
law, all municipalities in Iraq are managed by one department which
is part of the Ministry of Interior. Each municipality has a local
board elected by the people of the town to cooperate with the govern
ment.53 it is extremely difficult under such a bureaucratic structure
to accomplish any efficiency in the government even if the officials
were dedicated and sincere. But in actual practice it was a system
of corruption and bribery from the upper bureaucrats of the royal
family down to the farrash, the man who cleaned the offices and served
tea.
B. The failure of the educational system.
In 1920 Iraq had a high rate of illiteracy among its people.
Almost 99% of the people were illiterate. Dr. Hashim Jawad made a
study of the number of students attending elementary and secondary
schools in Iraq during the period 1920 - 1930.54
53ibid., pp. 93-95.
54jawad, o£. cit,., pp. 104-112.
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TABLE VI
NUMBER OF STUDENTS ATTENDED, AND SCHOOLS


































Table VI shows the slow development of elementary school
education. They succeeded in having 30,888 students in grammar
school after 10 years of monarchy.
TABLE VII
" NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS
IN 10 YEARS PERIOD 1920-1930





































Table VII shows the failure of the monarchy to develop secondary
education. In a country of about three million population, and after
10 years of the monarchy, they had less than two thousand students.
TABLE VIII
TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO
GRADUATED BETWEEN 1919-1944.
Total Number of Graduates
School 1919-1944
College of Law 1,201
College for Secondary School Teachers 38
College for Elementary School Teachers (boys) 2,900
College for Elementary School Teachers (girls) 991
Industrial Schools 351
Agriculture Schools 78
Secondary Schools (preparatory) 3,669
Secondary Schools (middle) 1,571
Elementary Schools 51,847
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Table 9 shows that only 5,500 professionals were graduated
from schools in Iraq during a twenty-five year period* This is an
extremely low number of graduates in a country of seven million popu
lation. The monarchy did not encourage education at a time when
there was a great need for it, and economically the country could
support massive education. The reason for this paradox was simple:
the intellectuals had turned against the monarchy and had heaped
bitter attacks on its policy.
VI. Cultural drift in the direction of revolutionary changes.
On the morning of September 8, 1933, it was announced that
King Faisal I was dead. His son, Ghazi, inherited the throne. Dur
ing this period Iraq's ruling oligarchy was divided into two main
groups: (1) those who favored British control, and (2) those who
opposed any British interference in their government. The pro-British
group was headed by former officers of the army such as General Nuri
es-Said, General Jafar el-Askari, and Janiel el-Madfai. The anti-
British group was more numerous, including such respected personali
ties as Hikmot Suleiman (very pro-Turkish and brother of powerful Turk
General Mahmud Shevket Pasha), Rashid Ali el-Gailani and Kamil el-
Chadirchi. This Anti-British group had formed in 1930 the Ikha el-
Watani, or National Brotherhood Party, and had opposed the signing
of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year. This group dominated Iraqi
politics from the death of Faisal I in 1933 to 1936.55 In 1931
some educated young men formed a group called Ahali, or Peoples'
Party, which began to preach a new philosophy of "populism." It was
, ojj. cit.t p. 273.
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a mixture of socialism and democracy, advocating radical reforms,
freedom of the press, and more governmental control. They published
a very popular newspaper called by the same name, Ahali. The Ahali
group cooperated with the National Brotherhood Party, and they in
stituted a military coup led by General Bakir Sidki. They succeeded
in overthrowing the pro-British cabinet and ousting its leader, Yasin
el-Hashimy. A new cabinet was established under the leadership of
Hitemot Suleiman on the same day. The cooperation between the National
Brotherhood Party and the Ahali group did not last long. Jafar Abo
el-Timan and Kamil el-Chadirchi of the Ahali Party resigned June 19,
1937. They disagreed on certain matters of internal and external
policy. This marked a turning point in the Iraqi revolution. The
two revolutionary powers were divided among themselves. The future
of a revolutionary government depends heavily on the disciplined
unity of the rebels prior to their success and also on the extent
to which they have been conditioned to accept the decisions of a re
cognized leadership. That is the reason why Iraq is suffering now
from political chaos. °
On August 11, 1937, Bakir Sidki, who led the army coup was
assassinated. As a result, the prime minister was forced to re




Tlffi POPULAR STAGE OF CROWD (COLLECTIVE)
EXCITEMENT AND UNREST
The socio-psychological conditions in this stage could be
classified as follows:
I. The spread of discontent and contagious extension of several signs
of unrest and discontent.
A. Collective excitement on Ghazi's death.
King Ghazi was not as weak and obedient to the British as was
his father. This fact was known to the Iraqi people. Consequently,
he gained some popularity during the six years he was in power. On
April 4, 1939, Ghazi met his death. The official statement of Baghdad
radio claimed that he died in an automobile accident near Baghdad.
Rumors spread over the country that the king was assassinated. It
was said that Ghazi was killed by the British with the cooperation
of Nuri es-Said and Abdul Ilah, Ghazi's brother-in-law. The British
newspapers made matters worse by expressing a feeling of relief at his
death.58 This exciting event caught the attention of the people and
aroused their deep concern and interest. As Bltimer expressed it:
In becoming preoccupied with this event and stirred
by its excitatory character, an individual is already
likely to lose some of his ordinary self-control and
to be dominated by the exciting object. Further,
Darwish, op,. cjLt., p. 224.
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this kind of experience, by arousing impulses and
feelings, establishes a condition of tension which
in turn, presses the individual on to action. Thus,
a number of people stimulated by the same exciting
event are disposed by that very fact to behave like
a crowd.^
Iraqi individuals lost their ordinary critical understanding and self-
control. They entered into rapport with members of other crowds and
became infused with the collective excitement which dominated them.
They were aroused by the belief that the king had been assassinated,
the British expression of relief at his death, and, worst of all, the
British action in making Abdul Ilah the regent of Iraq. Abdul Ilah
was the maternal uncle of the infant king, Faisal II, and he was to
assume the power of the king until Faisal II reached eighteen years
of age. Abdul Ilah's cruelty and blind obedience to the British was
well known.
The Iraqi people were aroused to the point of wanting to kill
the British. "Yes, kill them," they said to themselves, "and let Iraq
rest in peace!" These murderous impulses were aroused in the Iraqis
by their sympathetic sharing of collective excitement. Under such
conditions, a mob formed in the town of Mosul, and a member of the mob
shouted: "And now to the British Consulate!" Of course the rest of
the crowd answered: "Yes, to the British Consulate!" On their way to
the consulate, one member of the mob shouted: "Death to the imperi
alists!" The mob found the British Consul, Mr. Monckton and killed
him. They then proceeded to destroy everything in the building.
59
Blumer, og. cit., p. 179.
Darwish, og. cit.. p. 224.
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Similar mobs arose all over the country, but fortunately no one else
was killed. It is important to realize that the crowd would not have
reacted to a milder suggestion. They were aroused to the point of
murder, and they would have ignored any suggestion that was not in
line with the aroused impulse.
B. The Iraqis as a mass.
The plot to kill King Ghazi was a well-kept secret. Rashid
Ali el-Gailani reported in his autobiography that the Minister of
Finance, Rustam Haydar, was the only man who knew about the plot
between the British and Nuri es-Said. After the British Consul was
assassinated in Mosul, and mobs began to appear over the country, the
plotters became afraid that Haydar would reveal the plot. They paid
a man to kill the Minister of Finance so that he could not publish
what he knew. After Haydar's assassination, a special military court
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was established to pass a light sentence on the assassin.
King Ghazi's death and the ensuing events created a shared
excitement about national events, or, in other words, it created a
mass.
The Iraqi people turned into one big mass because of the
following reasons derived from Blumer's conception of a mass:
(1) They came from all walks of life: Christians, Shiias,
Yazides, Sunnis, Kurds, etc.
(2) They were an anonymous group.
(3) They were physically separated from one another. For
61Ibid., p. 225,
62Ibid.
example: the Kurdish community in the northeast,
the Shiias in the south, and the Christians in the
northern villages.
(4) They were not organized and, therefore, were not
able to act as a unity.°^
The mass excitement in 1940 had a wholesome effect on the
people in one respect. It focused the attention of the people on
national issues, and many ethnic group differences were forgotten.
These areas of national interest were not defined by any rules or
regulations. Every individual was highly interested in the "puppet"
monarchy and the British action in Iraq, but at the same time they
were puzzled by what they saw. They looked with suspicion on any
governmental action. Iraqi officials published very short and vague
statements about the government or any government action. They re
ferred to the British Embassy in Iraq in ambiguous symbols such as,
"John's father" or "the mayor of the western side," interpreting any
British action in a vague and confused way. At this stage there was
no established leadership. Iraqis were merely an aggregate of individ
uals who shared common feelings, thus they were homogeneous.
As time passed the Anti-British and anti-monarchy sentiments
kept building up. Added to this was the effect of Nazi propaganda
and the Nazi success in the early days of World War II.
C. The Nazi Coup d'etat.
Rashid Ali el-Gailani who was hostile to the British, in
cooperation with a group of four colonels known as the "Golden Square,"6*
oj>. £it., p. 180.
64xhey were Salah el-Dean, Kamil Shabih, Fahmi el-Saied, and
Mohammed Salam. These four men, as well as Gailani, were pro-Nazi in
their sentiments.
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plotted a coup d'etat. On April 12, 1941, they executed their plan
and ended the pro-British government by discharging the regent,
Abdul Ilah, from all his duties and appointing a new man, Sharif
Sharaf, in his place. Rashid Ali el-Gailani headed a new cabinet
called, "The Government for National Defense. "6->
Abdul Ilah, Nuri es-Said, the royal family, and the majority
of the cabinet members escaped to Jordan. Suddenly Iraq turned into
one large crowd. Mobs marched in every town and village in the
country asking the new government to, "kick the British out.1" Volun
teers of students, workers, and white-collar employees joined the
army. Toward the end of April a British-Indian military force landed
in Basra, a southern port. This provoked Iraqi opposition, and fight
ing began on May 1, 1941. Iraqi artillery surrounded the British air
base at Habbaniya while other forces kept watch on the grounds of the
British Embassy in Baghdad, where the British colony found refuge.
Rashid Ali and his associates hoped to secure Axis military assistance,
but Germany was not prepared to divert any substantial military aid to
Iraq due to their expected attack on Greece. Britain rushed additional
troops from Palestine to restore Habbaniya and fought a bloody battle
at Falluja. With cooperation from Basra-based troops they entered
Baghdad at the end of May. Rashid Ali escaped to Iran with the rest
of the rebel leaders, and the British forces restored the monarchy.66
D. "Al Wathbah." The Uprising.
January 15, 1948, a treaty was signed at Portsmouth, England,
65Lenczowski, oj>. £it., p. 273.
66Ibid.
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by the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Prime Minis
ter of Iraq, Salih Jabir. The treaty was to revise the Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1930. The London Times reported that Mr. Bevin said:
This treaty is the beginning of a new series of
treaties, regularizing and expressing the friend
ship between this country and the Arabic world.
Great Britain prizes that friendship and I am
sure the Arabic world equally prizes it. '
However, Majid Kadduri states in his book, Independent Iraq, that:
Before the text of the treaty was made public in
Baghdad, demonstrations took place almost daily since
the Iraqi Foreign Minister stated on 3 January that
negotiations were in progress for signing a new Treaty
of Alliance between Britain and Iraq.68
Mobs were organized by students of various colleges and high schools
and were joined by popular mobs when the treaty was released to the
Iraqi daily papers on January 16, 19A8.69 These mobs were demanding:
(1) The resignation of Salih Jabir and dissolution of the
Parliament*
(2) New elections.
(3) Repudiation of the treaty.
(4) More freedom for individuals and groups.
The popular mobs reached a high pitch when the Prime Minister, Salih
Jabir, returned from England and broadcast a statement to the nation
defending his position before the Iraqi public.70
I took part in the student demonstrations in my home town of
67The London Times. January 16, 1948, p. 4.
68Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq. (London: 1951), p. 270.
69The Arabic text in, Sawt jal Ahali. Baghdad, January 16, 1948.
70Ibid., p. 272.
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Mosul. These student groups used to start from the largest prepara
tory school in the town. Usually the demonstration would be planned
the previous night, but sometimes they would be spontaneous. For
instance, during a regular class period, a student would stand up
suddenly and shout, "Yaskoot, Nuri es-Said YaJ" ("Down with Nuri
es-Saidi"). The rest of the students would answer, "Yaskoot'"
("Down.1"). The students would carry the initiator on their shoulders
out of the classroom. The other classes would join the first group
and they would continue out to the yard. A short meeting would be
held, with two or three students making speeches against the Prime
Minister.
The students would inarch through the city past the other
schools, gaining new marchers as they went. According to the size
of the group, either one or two of them would read poetry or make
impromptu speeches while passing through the streets. After the stu
dents from the several schools were assembled, they would march
through the market place. There the students would be joined by a
crowd of citizens. By that time the assemblage would be quite large,
and they would continue the march to the governor's house.
The excitement would build up to a fever pitch on these marches.
One person would usually be carried on the shoulders of some of the
boys, and he would call the Prime Minister a traitor to the nation.
He would enumerate the demands of the students and end by asking for
the execution of Salih Jabir.
Some incidents occurred between the police and the students,
but there was no bloodshed at that time. On one occasion, a crowd
of students, workers, and opposition party members, composed of
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Istiklal, Al watani'el Democracy, and the Communist Party marched
to the police headquarters in Mosul. They destroyed the front sec
tion of the building. They accomplished this without bloodshed, for
the police ran from the station. For about a week all policemen were
afraid to go out of their homes in their uniforms. If they ventured
from their homes, heavy stones would be thrown on them from the pro
jecting windows of the houses, killing or injuring them severely.
In Baghdad, a mob of high school and college students were
surrounded by the police on January 27, 1948, near Al Ma'moon bridge.
Orders were handed down from Salih Jabir to the general head of the
police department, Abd al-Aziz'l Qassab, to shoot down the students.
The number of dead is unknown, but Sawt al-Ahali listed twenty-one
youngsters who were killed and hundreds who were injured.71 As a
result, Iraq was boiling with anger and hatred for the monarchy.
This clash, which happened for the first time in Iraq's
recent history, was called by the Iraqi people: "The Battle of the
Bridge," (Ma'raket'l Jesir"), and the movement was called "The Up
rising", ("Al Wathbah").
Salih Jabir presented his resignation on the same day of the
"Battle of the Bridge," January 27, 1948, and a new cabinet was formed.
This was an attempt to answer some of the popular demands, but the
people of Iraq vowed never to recognize the monarchy.
II. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals.
After the Nazi coup d'etat in 1941, it was clear to every
Iraqi that the monarchy was protected by the British army of occupa-
71Sawt al-Ahali. January 28, 1948, Baghdad, p. 1.
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tion in Iraq. Mr. Lenczowski reports that the majority of Iraq's
intelligentsia were estranged from the regime, with which they
associated all the evils of corruption, subservience to Western
imperialism, and isolation from the mainstream of Arab thought and
policies.7^ Iraq's intelligentsia were organized into the follow
ing groups:
A. The Istiklal - Independence Party.
The Istiklal Party was established April 20, 1946, and was
headed by Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, Faik el-Samieraie, and Seddick
Shanshal. They advocated a moderate socialist platform. They
stood for complete emancipation from, and severance of links with
Britain. They advocated an abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of
1930 and the policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict. This
party consisted of members and supporters of the secret Baath Party.73
It was originated by a Syrian Arab Christian named Michel Aflak, who
strongly advocated Arab Unity, moderate socialism, and neutrality
between the east and west. The Baath Party was not officially a
part of the Istiklal Party, but they had similar platforms. Many of
the members of the Istiklal Party also belonged to the Baath Party.7*
Aflak is worshipped by his followers; but, contrary to other
Arab national leaders, no crowds have ever shouted his name, chanted
his name or paraded his picture. This is true even until the present
time when he controls the party in Syria and Iraq. Although he




controls the government through his position in the Baath Party,
Aflak has never held an official post in the government.
Aflak lives in a small, cramped, Damascus apartment with a
frayed carpet, cheap furniture, and clothes drying on a balcony
washline. The son of a nationalist-minded shopkeeper, Aflak pas
sionately embraced the ideal of Arab unity even as a Damascus school
boy. His education at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he graduated with
honors in history, was financed by a successful uncle who had emigrated
to Brazil. After a brief teaching career at a Damascus school, Aflak
resigned in 1942 to devote his life to politics and his personal cre
ation, the Baath Party.
Aflak appealed to the people through his writings which over
flowed with such sentiments as: "Nationalism is love before everything
else;"75 and "A new page is open, the page of those who walk with
naked souls as if they were in their own bedroom." The more he talked
about wahda Arabiya. (Arab unity), the more influence he gained among
the people. His influence extended even to the ranks of the leaders
of the Arabic countries. The Baath slogan, "Unity, Freedom, Socialism,"
was blandly appropriated by many Arab leaders.
The party was revolutionary in nature. Aflak defined revo
lution as, "...that powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle,
without which the reawakening of a nation cannot be understood."76
When they came to power, the Istiklal Party was full of the
Baath supporters, but the Baath had its own secret organization, and
75sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism. (Los Angeles, 1962), p. 242.
76"Middle East," Time, LXXXI, March 29, 1963. pp. 24-25.
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up until the mid-1950's, there were very few Baathists in Iraq.77
The monarchy was not as harsh in treating the members of the Baath
and Istiklal Parties as they were with other political parties
because: (1) They had moderate, and sometimes conservative stands
on political issues; (2) They opposed Nuri es-Said, but not the
monarchy. (3) They did not have a large following; (4) The leaders
of Istiklal did not hesitate to accept cabinet, or other high govern
mental positions for the price of turning against their own party.
In fact, Nuri es-Said*s party was full of ex-members of the Istiklal
Party. The leaders of both parties used to be arrested after every
riot, but they would be released unharmed after a few weeks when the
mobs had quieted down.7**
B. The National Democratic Party.
The National Democratic Party grew out of an organization
called the Ahali which was established in 1931, by a group of edu
cated young men. As was mentioned earlier, the Ahali group continued
to operate until April 20, 1946, when the government permitted them
to establish the National Democratic Party. Their influential news
paper, Ahali. was widely read throughout the Middle East. The Party
was headed by the well-respected popular leader and intellectual
called Kamil el-Chadirchi. He was one of the originators of the Ahali
group, on which he spent most of his family's wealth. His editorials
in the Ahali were the dominant subject of conversation among students,
intelligentsia, and urban proletariat. The publication of the Ahali
was suspended time and time again by the government.
77Ibid., pp. 24-25.
78Darwish, og. cjjt., p. 275.
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The second personality and Vice-Chairman of the National
Democratic Party was a millionaire from Mosul, Mohammed Hadid by
name, an economist who disagreed with Kamil and took advantage of
his position in the Party to augment his own wealth. This was espe
cially true when he became Minister of Finance during the Kassim
Regime, 1958-1963.
This group of leftist intellectuals attacked Western imperi
alism in the newspaper, Ahali. They thought that the monarchy was
a cheap tool in the hands of the West, to be used by the West to
further its own interests in Iraq. They advocated positive neutral
ity in the cold war between East and West, but they did not hesitate
to applaud the Soviet Union on many occasions. They advocated social
ism as a solution for domestic problems and steadily campaigned for
restoration of the democratic process, social justice, and emancipa
tion from Western imperialism in both the political and economic
field.79 The Communist Party, which was organized in 1941, operated
illegaly in Iraq, but some of its members were interested in the
National Democratic Party. The Communist published a paper called,
Al-Kaidah. In it they opposed and critized every political group.
They demanded a Republic maintaining close ties with the U.S.S.R.
The Communist Party was led by Yousef Salman Yousef who was called
Comrade Fahid. He and three other party leaders were hanged on
February 14, 1949.80
Since communism had been outlawed in Iraq, the secret police
79Lenczowski, oj>. cit., p. 275.
80See Az-Zaman. February 15, 1949, for the text of the death
sentence.
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kept the members of the party under surveillance. They were often
imprisoned in the Negrat'l Salman, a medieval-type prison. Here they
were subjected to the most inhumane treatment ever known in the
twentieth century. Some of them had their fingernails pulled out or
their hair burned. Others would be tied upside down in a dirty toilet,
and, in addition to this, they would be whipped. Some prisoners were
given injections of bacteria to cause tuberculosis of the bone. The
prisoners were tortured in most inhumane fashion, but they were left
just enough strength to survive. Reports of these inhumane punishments
were published in the Ahali. Consequently, it created a very strong
and violent hatred for Nuri es-Said and the monarchy.81
We notice from the above discussion that the revolutionary
power blocks were divided among themselves, each having played a role
in revolutionary behavior, each having had a certain number of followers,
and each opposed to the rest of the revolutionary power blocks. The
Baath, for example, was very strongly opposed to the National Democratic
and the Communist Parties and disagreed with the Istiklal Party on
different matters. So did every other power block. This was danger
ous because, as Amann put it:
The future of an insurrectionary government depends
heavily on the disciplined unity of the rebels prior
to their success and on the extent to which they have
been conditioned to accept the decisions of a recog
nized leadership.82
This split opposition of the power blocks posed a dangerous threat to
the future authority of the new government to be established in 1958.
81Khadduri, o£. jcit., p. 271.
82Amann, op_. cit., p. 41.
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Borrowing the term from Amann, I referred to each of these
political groups as a "power block" because each of them was too
strong to be suppressed by ordinary police action. They had usurped
military, administrative, and judicial powers traditionally held by
the monarchy.S3
III. The presentation £f revolutionary demands which, jlf granted.
would have amounted £o the abdication of those in power.
Around the end of 1951, the opposition to the pro-British Prime
Minister, Nuri es-Said consisted of the following political groupings:
(1) The Istiklal Party.
(2) The National Democratic Party.
(3) Independent politicians who hated and opposed Nuri
es-Said personally.
The above three groups had formed a political unity called, "The United
Popular Front" for purposes of inter-party cooperation.^ Both the
Istiklal and National Democratic Parties kept their organization and
followers separate. The United Popular Front published a widely read
newspaper called The Popular Front.85
On October 28, 1952, the United Popular Front presented a note
to the Regent, Abdul Hah, signed by the popular leaders of the Front.
This note was nothing more than a statement of revolutionary demands.
If the monarchy had granted these demands, such action would have amounted
to its abdication. These revolutionary demands were published in every





(1) Universal direct suffrage.
(2) Purge of the Administration.
(3) Limitation of land ownership.
(4) Disarmament of the tribes.
(5) Lowering of prices on consumer goods.
(6) Revision of the constitution in order to abolish the
royal power to dissolve Parliament and demand resigna
tions from cabinet members.
(7) Peremptory abrogation of the Treaty of 1930 with
Britain.
(8) Rejection of the Western-sponsored regional defense
plan.86
The regent's reply was very unsatisfactory. He refused to even con
sider any of their demands. The editors of The Popular Front published
his reply the next day with a very severe criticism. The members of
the United Popular Front redoubled their efforts to obtain reforms.
They threatened to boycott the forthcoming elections unless the elec
toral law was amended to provide for direct elections.87 The demands
of the United Popular Front had the support of the majority of the
people, and they had hoped to see the demands accomplished. The re
gent's curt refusal created a feeling among the people that there was
an urgent need to act.
The students of the colleges in Baghdad went on strike, and a
committee was established in each college to prevent the entrance of
students to the college buildings. This tended to build tension and
collective excitement went very high. The government attempted to
87Ibid.
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break up the strike. On November 22, 1952, a student in the College
of Pharmacy and Chemistry was sent as an emissary of the government
to break up the strike. He asked the strike committee to let him
enter the school to attend class. An argument started between the
student and the strike committee. The student pulled out a pistol
and started to shoot into the group of unarmed men, injuring some of
them. Within a very short time the riot had spread all over Baghdad.
Large mobs initiated an attack on Nuri es-Said's headquarters, the
United States Information Office, and other government offices.
Local police failed to prevent the attacks of the mobs.8° These riots
were symptomatic of the political situation in Iraq.
Urban intelligentsia were united with the poor in a rebellious
struggle against the government and foreign influences. Faced with an
untenable situation, the cabinet resigned on the first day of the de
monstrations. On November 23, 1952, the regent asked General Nuri el-
Din Mahmud, the army chief of staff, to form a cabinet. Mahmud's first
act was to proclaim martial law, close the schools, and arrest the
leaders of the Istiklal, National Democrats, and Communist Parties.
After having applied these repressive measures, General Mahmud broad
cast his cabinet's decision to implement a number of reforms. In
practice, none of these reforms were carried out. The Premier banned
publication of twenty-eight newspapers including the publications
QQ
belonging to any political party. *




THE FORMAL STAGE OF THE FORMATION OF
PUBLICS AND FORMULATION OF ISSUES
From the discussion of the Iraqi political parties, we noticed
that each of the power blocks had fixed attitudes and motives. Each
had interpreted its own philosophy into the Iraqi framework, and from
it each block had developed its aim, and transferred it to values.
Each power block had its organizational structure, and finally each
had its own leadership.
It was mentioned earlier that the Iraqi people had reached the
condition of being a mass. The next step in this development is the
formation of publics. Borrowing from Blumer's definition of publics,
the Iraqi people were:
(1) Confronted with the issue of government.
(2) The opposing power blocks or parties were divided in
their opinions as to how to solve the national problems.
(3) These power blocks were engaged in discussions over
the issues of the government.90
The Iraqi people were aroused by an appeal to a sentiment which was
common to them. They then began to mill and develop rapport. Their
expressions were in a form of public sentiment and not public opinion.
The last two or three years which preceeded the revolution of
1958 were relatively quiet, at least outwardly. The tension of the
90
Blunter, ojj. cit., p. 189.
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people was building up to an outbreak, but it was as if the fires of
revolution were smoldering beneath the surface.
CHAPTER VI
THE INSTITUTIONAL STAGE OF LEGALIZATION
AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi revolution was transferred from
the formal to the institutional stage as follows:
!• The psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional founda
tion of revolution.
By 6:00 am, July 14, 1958, Baghdad radio was trumpeting: "Citizens
of Baghdad, the monarchy is dead! The Republic is here.1"91 Those who
were up at that early hour were shocked to hear the news on the radio.
The news created a state of confusion among the people. They turned
the speakers of their radios as high as they could. They were shout
ing and crying: "Wake up, wake up.1 We are free.1 It is a republic.'"92
The people ran into the streets in their night clothes. Teenagers
shouted: "Long live our republic: to hell with Nuri es-Said, Abdul
Ilah, and the monarchy.1" They then started marching in the streets.93
Asked to describe their feelings at that moment, some Iraqi students
failed to find words to express their feelings. They kept repeating
that it was a happy moment: the happiest moment of their lives. On
that morning the people of Iraq were drunk with pleasure, and the





whole population turned into a single mob.
Up at dawn to leave for a Baghdad Fact meeting in Istanbul,
King Faisal II was still in his underwear shaving when the soldiers
broke past the guards at the gates of the royal palace. Outside,a
mob of people had already set the pillared white building ablaze, and
smoke drove the twenty-three year old king down into the courtyard
where the soldiers and crowds were waiting. Crown Prince Abdul Hah
ordered the palace guard to open fire and reached for his own pistol.
Guns blazed on both sides, and Faisal II was dead. The crown prince
fell wounded nearby.
While the king's body was treated with respect, Abdul Hah
lived to feel the full revenge of the people. They tied him to an
army jeep and dragged him, while still alive, in the streets of
Baghdad. After he was dead they cut his body in pieces and hanged
the pieces in front of the building which housed the Ministry of
Defense. They allowed the pieces of Abdul Ilah's body to hang for
94
two days in the same spot where he used to hang his enemies.
The man who was directly responsible for the coup was Briga
dier General Abdul Karim Kassim, the leader of the Twentieth Brigade.
His next in command was Colonel Abdul Salam Aref. The plan which was
executed on the morning of July 14, 1958, had been born in a secret
meeting between these two men in Geneva, Switzerland, several months
earlier.
Later that same morning Baghdad radio broadcast the following
announcement:
ews Week. July 28, 1958, p. 25.
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With the aid of God Almighty and the support of the
people and the Armed forces, we have liberated the
country from the domination of a corrupt group which
was installed by imperialism to lull the people. The
Army is yours. It has already achieved your wish
and got rid of tyrants who played with the rights of
the people. It is your duty to support it. Victory
can be achieved only through the organization of the
army, and by defending it against imperialist con
spiracies. We appeal to the people to inform the
authorities of all traitors and corrupt persons so
that we may get rid of them. We ask you to be united
in an effort to destroy those criminals and to rid the
country of their evils.
We call on you to be calm and to uphold discipline,
unity, and cooperation in the interests of the country.
Be confident that we shall continue to work for you.
Power will be given to a government inspired by the
people. There will be an Iraqi republic which will
preserve Iraqi unity, maintain brotherly ties with
other Arab countries, and treaties which are in the
interests of the country and will carry out the prin
ciples of the Bandung Conference and the United Nations
Charter. A council of sovereignty will carry out pre
sidential duties until there is a general plebiscite.
The Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces.95
Answering a Newsweek reporter on July 28, 1958, General Abdul
Karim Kassim, the leader of the Twentieth Brigade who marched through
Baghdad late on the night of July 13, 1958, said:
Only two men knew when the zero hour arrived-I and
my friend, Col. Abdel fiic| Salam Mohammed Aref.
...Many men throughout the entire army were involved.
So when Baghdad fell, all the rest of the country came
in with it, since each member knew exactly what his
assignment was in the over-all plan. ...on that day
(July 14), we had them all in one place, Priemier Nuri
es-Said and the royal family, so we chose that momemt
to finish everything.96
95Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, August-September, 1958, p. 293.
96News Week. August 4, 1958, p. 25.
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Life magazine reports that:
The events of July 14, 1958, did not shock just the
Iraqi people or the Arabs, but the whole world. The
American, British, and Russian cabinets, and the
United Nations Security Council all had emergency
meetings. In the United States, the Congress had
a secret joint session upon an urgent request from
President Eisenhower. As a result, the marines
were ordered to land in Lebanon immediately.97
The British Cabinet met in an emergency session, confirming that the
British Embassy in Baghdad had been ransacked and set on fire. They
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decided to land troops in Jordan immediately. Soviet Premier Nikita
Khruschev proposed an immediate Summit Conference of all the major
powers of the world, i.e., Britain, United States, France, Russia,
and India, including D. Hammarskjb'ld, the Secretary General of the
United Nations. Khrushchev thought that Great Britain and the United
States were threatening world peace by sending troops to the Middle
East. In this connection he said: "The decision of peace or war de
pends on you. ...(The Soviet Union has) ballistic rockets of all varie-
99
ties, including intercontinental." It is odd that Mr. Khruschev
would invite all the Western powers and India to talk, and probably
gamble with Iraq's future, without asking Iraq's consent. The Soviet
Union supported the new regime in Iraq because it destroyed a pro-
western monarchy. The new regime in Iraq was not Communist, however.
The American television networks cut their regular programs
to broadcast the most dramatic response to the crises which developed
in the halls of the United Nations. The United Nations Security
97Life. XLIV, July 28, 1958.
Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, August-September, 1958, p. 293.
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Council debated. Opposing lines were swiftly drawn. U. S. delegate
Henry Cabot Lodge declared that the Marines would withdraw as soon as
United Nations forces replaced them. Russia's Arkady Sobolev demanded
that the West, "...cease its armed intervention," but at the end, all
three United Nations resolutions; American, Soviet, and Swedish, were
beaten. The Security Council was in familiar deadlock.100 The debates
actually accomplished nothing. After a few months British and United
States troops were voluntarily withdrawn from the Middle East.
II. The reasons for the success of the July 14, 1958. Revolution.
The reasons for the success of the revolution of July 14, 19S8,
could be summarized as follows:
(1) The quick and flashy speed of its accomplishments.
(2) The complete secrecy of the plan.
(3) The response and support of the people during the
first hours of the morning of July 14, 1958.
(4) The monarchy had no support from the people. In
fact, the people were wildly expressing their pleasure
at its downfall.
III. The revolutionary leadership.
Abdul Karim Kassim was born in Baghdad in 1914. After a teaching
career of one year he enrolled on September, 1932, in the Military School.
Throughout his military training and service, he was well known for his
courage and honesty.101
Within a few days after July 14, 1958, the revolution entered
a new and dangerous phase. Kassim's picture started to appear on the
IQOLife. XLIV, July 28, 1958, p. 24.
101Glimpses From the Life History of the Leader Abdul Karim
Kassim. Iraqi Government Press, Baghdad, 1959.
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walls of many of the buildings in the country. Everyday he would
visit a different place and make a "historical" speech. Newspapers
started publishing his picture daily on almost every page of the
paper. They spoke of him as a savior, a saint, the prophet, semi-
heavenly, and dozens of such names. In addition to this, his official
title was: His Excellency, The Leader, The Prime Minister and Com
mander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abdul Karim Kassim. In other
words, Kassim was worshipped by the people. This by itself changed
Kassim's image of himself, and he started to revaluate himself.
His new image of himself was derived from what he thought the people
thought about him. Perhaps that is one of the strongest factors in
making him a dictator.
From the very first day of the Iraqi revolution it was obvious
that the leader, General Kassim, intended to include in his government
those elements that had been persecuted by the monarchy. He took into
his government Fuad el-Rikabi (Baath Party) and Seddick Shanshal
(Istiklal Party) from the right, and Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah (pro-Communist
but not a member of the Communist Party) and Mohammed Haded (National
Democratic Party) from the left. By balancing right and left, Kassim
hoped to be able to achieve economic and political independence within
a short time. He soon realized, however, that his hopes would not
materialize. As was mentioned earlier, the various power blocks were
in disagreement with each other.
These power blocks were too strong to be suppressed by ordinary
police action because each of them had usurped some measure of mili
tary, administrative, judicial and popular power. What has been
happening in Iraq from July, 1958, up to the present time is that each
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power block has been trying to destroy the others by any means possi
ble. The result is the political chaos which exists in Iraq at the
present time. Stability under such circumstances is impossible. The
following examples are partial proof for this assumption. In Septem
ber, 1958, Kassim discovered that his deputy, Abdul Salam Aref, was
planning to overthrow him.1**2 From the beginning of the revolution,
Aref had displayed unwavering loyalty to the President of Egypt, Gamel
Abdul Nasser. In December, 1959, he discovered that Rashid Ali el-
Gailani was plotting a pro-Nasser coup in Iraq. Gailani had led a
pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in 1941. He had fled from Iraq to escape a
death penalty, but he returned to Iraq after being assured that the
death penalty had been annulled. "*
Following his discovery of these two attempts to establish
a pro-Nasser regime in Iraq, Kassim began to reduce the influence of
the pro-Egypt members of his cabinet. He finally forced the resigna
tion of the Baath and Istiklal Ministers on February 7, 1959. Then
in March, 1959, Mohammed el-Shawaf, an officer in the Army, staged a
pro-Baath revolt against him, but the revolt was not successful.
In the meantime the Communist had gained a greater following.
Their influence increased to such an extent that on June 28, 1959,
they sent a petition to Kassim signed by statesmen, scientists, and
top civil servants, demanding their inclusion in the government.
While the Premier did not respond to this demand, he nevertheless
named on July 13, 1959, the eve of the first anniversary of the revo-
102Vito Priestly, "The Political Situation in Iraq." Middle
Eastern Affairs. XIII (New York, May, 1962), p. 139.
1Q3lbid.
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lution, two ardent pro-Communist ministers to his Cabinet: Dr.
Nazihah el-Dulaimi, as Minister of Municipal Affairs (the first Arab
woman to hold a ministerial post), and Auni Yousef, as Minister of
Labor.
During the celebration of the first anniversary of the revo
lution, the Communists made a fatal mistake: They organized a mas
sacre of their opponents, especially among the Turksmens in the
Kirkuk area. Kassim reacted firmly. He disbanded the People's Re
sistance Organization, a semi-military group under Communists influence
and ordered the discharge of the Communist Committees for the Defense
of the Republic, which existed in every governmental office. Kassim
was now fighting on two fronts — against the extreme right and against
the extreme left. This encouraged the Baath Party to make an attempt
on his life, which almost succeeded.
IV. The assets and liabilities of the Kassim regime.
A. The liabilities.
Throughout the Kassim regime, July 14, 1953 to February 8, 1963,
power blocks have made every attempt to destroy each other. Their means
of destruction include street fighting, massacres, and assassinations.
The police are powerless to stop such actions. There is every reason
to believe that this situation will continue, probably for many years.
As Charles A. Ellwood suggests in his book, The Psychology of Human
Society, a sudden and violent attack on the old social order may
result in a general breakdown in the habits of obedience to the govern
ment in a large part of the population. Ellwood says that:
Now, there is always a tendency in an individual to re
version to simple, animal-like activities following the
complete breakdown of a habit. This tendency becomes
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much more pronounced if the breakdown of the old
habit is accompanied by violence.*"*
Pitirim Sorokin postulated a thesis that the return to normal after
a revolution takes as much time as the build-up to the revolution. "-*
According to Lyford P. Edwards, "...it takes three generations to
develop a revolution."1^ In the light of what Ellwood, Sorokin, and
Edwards have said, we get a sad picture of the situation in Iraq.
Iraq will probably not return to normal for at least forty years.
On the morning of July 14, 1958, the people of Iraq were lifted
into a state of near ecstasy at their belief that, with the monarchy
dead, they would no longer have to live in fear. This hope has not
come to pass. For example, the people in Iraq are afraid to write
almost any news to their relatives in other countries for fear of
government reprisals.
B. The assets.
Even under such conditions of instability, the Kassim regime
succeeded in making gains in several areas.
1. Industrial advancements.
Kathleen M. Langley headed a study tracing the growth of industry
in Iraq up until 1962, and published it in a book entitled, The Indus
trialization of Iraq.*97 She expressed that the reasons for the failure
of the Nuri es-Said regime to promote modern industry was undoubtedly
s A. Ellwood, The Psychology of Human Society, (New
York, 1917), p. 260.
105Sorokin, og. £it., p. 8.
l06Edwards, og. jcit., p. 17.
1O'Kathleen M. Langley, The Industrialization £f Iraq, (Cambridge,
1962), p. 1.
67
one of the reasons for the vide support given to the leaders of the
revolution. She reached the conclusion that:
...much had been done to lay the foundation for Iraq's
industrial development, and carefully conceived plans
for the country's rapid industrial growth were under
way when impatience, frustration, and intolerance pre
vailed in the summer of 1958.108
Building a handful of industrial plants does not benefit the country at
all unless the people learn how to run them and markets can be found
for their products. The monarchy failed to establish any industry.
It lacked the basis not only for modern industry, but for national
cohesion. The building up of the country's governmental administra
tion and social overhead capital and the modernization of its agri
culture were therefore prerequisite to the growth of industry in
Iraq.109
The Ministry of Industry published a pamphlet in 1961, which
claimed that new industries which had been built since July, 1958,
had produced the following products:
(a) 470,500,000 kilowatt hours of electricity
(b) 33,421 tons of sugar
(c) 250,208 tons of cement
(d) 767,479 gross of cigarettes
(e) 76,700 yards of cloth





HOOur Industry. Ministry of Industry Publication, June 5, 1961.
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This rapid industrial advancement was accomplished in a period of
less than three years with the aid of Russian technicians and loans.
After the Baath Party overthrew the Kassim regime, February 8, 1963,
the Russian technicians left the country, and I assume that all of
these factories are not in operation now. If this assumption is
correct, Iraq will be heavily burdened financially to pay back the
loans with most of the factories idle.
2. Educational accomplishments.
Three years after Kassim came into power, the Ministry of
Education published a pamphlet^ giving the growth in education
during the Kassim regime. All information and figures in this
section are taken from that pamphlet. Table IX shows the percentage
of increase in schools, teachers, and students during the first three
years of the Kassim regime.
TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND























tion, July 14, 1962, Baghdad.
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The national budget for education rose from 14,452,354 dinars112
in 1957, to 29,750,000 dinars in 1962. This was an increase of 106
percent.
During the last year of the monarchy, fifty percent of the
nation's boys were not attending school. By 1962, this number had
been reduced to nine percent. As for the girls, the percentage not
attending school fell from eighty-three to sixty-five during the same
period.
3. Agricultural achievements.
During the monarchy a limited number of landlords controlled
all of the land in Iraq, and the farmers lived in extreme poverty.
They lived in mud huts and ate barley and dates mainly. The system
of land-holding made near-slaves out of the people.
Kassim enacted an agraian reform law as one of the first reforms
he put into effect. According to this law, land ownership was limited.
Small plots of land were distributed to the poor farmers, and Kassim
also helped the people to obtain agricultural machinery.
While it is true that the Kassim regime had its liabilities,
still he did much good for Iraq. The majority of the Iraqi people





The purpose of this study was to analyze the uncompleted Iraqi
revolution, using Rex D. Hopper's four stages of revolutionary behav
ior, Herbert Blumer's analysis of social movements, and Peter Amann's
article on revolution.
In analyzing the Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958, I have
reached the conclusion that the revolution actually began in 1917,
when the British army, under the leadership of Sir Stanley Maude,
drove the Turks out of Iraq. At that time the Turks had been occu
pying Iraq for approximately three hundred years. The Iraqi people
were accustomed to obeying the Turkish authorities, but the British
conquest of the Turks broke the habit of obedience to the Turkish
government. Until this date the habit of obedience to governmental
authority has not been re-established, therefore the state's monopoly
of power has not been restored. The Iraqi revolution will not be
completed until these two goals are reached, and this state of stabil
ity may not be reached for two additional generations.
The small, seemingly insignificant uprisings which occurred
throughout the years from 1917 to 1958, were symptons of the unrest
and dissatisfaction of the people of Iraq. An outbreak such as the
July 14, 1958, revolution was bound to occur. It only needed a strong
leader with popular support. The people would have been willing to sup-
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port almost anyone who would strike at the hated monarchy. The Iraqi
people had suffered long under the regime of the monarchy which was dom
inated by the British. On the morning of July 14, 1958, they were wild
with joy that a leader had appeared to emancipate them. They hailed
Kassim as a deliverer.
History will record the deeds of Kassim in a more objective way
than we are able to do today. Was he a tyrant as the Baathist officers
declared, or a deliverer? It is certain that he did much good for Iraq
by providing better education, promoting more industry, improving agri
cultural conditions, and building better housing for the Iraqi people.
In spite of these advancements, however, the people still lived in fear.
Of what real value is more food on the table if the people are too fear
ful to eat?
Instead of being an end to the revolution which had been in prog
ress since 1917, the July 14, 1958, coup d'etat was just another phase
in the reactionary stage. What progress the Kassim regime was making toward
the completion of the Iraqi revolution was annulled by the Baath counter
revolution on February 8, 1963.
I believe that Iraq has now reached the highest peak of reaction,
as exhibited in street fighting, the Kurdish revolt, attempted revolts
by other groups, and military executions. How long this reactionary
stage will last cannot be determined. It is certain to continue until
such time as the people reach a state of exhaustion; then it will start
to decline gradually.
ADDENDUM
In August, 1962, in a conference with Dr. Tilman C. Cothran, I
chose the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1953, as the subject of my thesis.
At that time I made the statement that another revolution was expected
in Iraq. I was halfway through with my research when the expected revo
lution became a fact.
!• The Baath Counter-Revolution.
On February 3, 1963, junior Baathist officers of the armed forces
staged a successful coup d'etat against Premier Kassim and claimed that
they had "destroyed the tyrant." Their planes and tanks demolished
Kassim's Defense Ministry in Baghdad, where the Premier lived under
heavy guard. *^
Kassim was captured by the rabble in his Defense Ministry strong
hold on the next day of the coup and was executed by a firing squad after
a drumhead court martial.^^ The Atlanta Journal reports that an eye
witness estimated about 1,500 persons were killed in the initial day of
the revolt. No official figures were released.^-^ Tehran radio said
rebel forces and pro-Kassim troops clashed in the area around Amarah,
a city 20 miles southeast of Baghdad. A clandestine radio transmitter
in the Amarah area called on Iraqis to take arms against the new regime.
H3The Atlanta Journal, February 8, 1963, p. 1.
luIbid., p. 3.
115The Atlanta Journal» February 11, 1963, p. 5.
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Another broadcast said that Communist groups in Al-Asamiyah, a Shiia
city north of Baghdad on the east bank of the Tigris River fought a
heavy battle on Friday, February 15, a week later. In Baghdad, shoot
ing was heard on both sides of the Tigris River. Iraqi troops and
heavily armed civilians who called themselves "National Guardsmen"
hunted down Communists and pro-Kassim elements a week later. 1& After
about two weeks, the Baath government in Iraq claimed that everything
was under their control and had quieted down.
II, The Kurdish Revolt.
Before Kassim's death, the Kurds were fighting the government
for the right to set up an autonomous state in the north. After the
Baath Party took over on February 8, 1963, the Kurds began negotiating
with them, but the talks broke off and an ultimatum of twenty-four
hours expired at 6:00 am, Monday, June 10, 1963. On the second day,
Baghdad radio broadcast that army units inflicted heavy casualties on
the Kurdish forces. The Egyptain newspaper Al-Akhbar said: "250
Kurdish rebels have been killed and 21 captured in the first day of
the fighting."117 To the present, the Kurdish problem has not been
solved. The Soviet Union has indicated its sympathy for the Kurds.
III. The failure of two plots.
A. The Istiklal - Nasser plot.
After three months of negotiations with President Nasser of
Egypt, the Baath Party representing Syria and Iraq signed a communique
declaring their proposal for a tripartite United Arab Republic effective
u6The Atlanta Journal, February 15, 1963, p. 3.
ll7The Atlanta Journal, June 12, 1963, p. 12.
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September 27, 1963, but Radio Baghdad broadcast on Saturday, May 25,
1963, that the revolutionary command had wrecked a plot to "split the
Army, provoke an economic crisis, alienate confidence in the government
and organize massacres in the country."1*® The plotters were members
of the pro-Istiklal Party including Mohammed Seddick Shanshal. All
Istiklal members and Nasser supporters were arrested.119
B* The Communist plot.
On July 3, 1963, the government announced that its troops and
police crushed an attempted Communist coup at the Rashid army camp
near Baghdad.^^0 Earlier, many Communist were sentenced to death
for resisting the Baath government.121
And so it goes in Iraq: one uprising follows closely on another.
When will it end? When will the people find relief from this unsettled
state of affairs? No one knows for certain, but it will be many years.
n8The Atlanta Constitution. May 27, 1963, p. 8.
120The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, July 4, 1963, p. 9.
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